### 1

#### Debt ceiling will pass and political capital is key

Pace 9/12 (Julie, “AP White House correspondent, Syria debate on hold, Obama refocuses on agenda”, The Fresno Bee, September 9 of 2013, http://www.fresnobee.com/2013/09/12/3493538/obama-seeks-to-focus-on-domestic.html

With a military strike against Syria on hold, President Barack Obama tried Thursday to reignite momentum for his second-term domestic agenda. But his progress could hinge on the strength of his standing on Capitol Hill after what even allies acknowledge were missteps in the latest foreign crisis.¶ "It is still important to recognize that we have a lot of things left to do here in this government," Obama told his Cabinet, starting a sustained White House push to refocus the nation on matters at home as key benchmarks on the budget and health care rapidly approach.¶ "The American people are still interested in making sure that our kids are getting the kind of education they deserve, that we are putting people back to work," Obama said.¶ The White House plans to use next week's five-year anniversary of the 2008 financial collapse to warn Republicans that shutting down the government or failing to raise the debt limit could drag down the still-fragile economy. With Hispanic Heritage Month to begin Monday, Obama is also expected to press for a stalled immigration overhaul and urge minorities to sign up for health care exchanges beginning Oct. 1.¶ Among the events planned for next week is a White House ceremony highlighting Americans working on immigrant and citizenship issues. Administration officials will also promote overhaul efforts at naturalization ceremonies across the country. On Sept. 21, Obama will speak at the Congressional Black Caucus Gala, where he'll trumpet what the administration says are benefits of the president's health care law for African-Americans and other minorities.¶ Two major factors are driving Obama's push to get back on track with domestic issues after three weeks of Syria dominating the political debate. Polls show the economy, jobs and health care remain Americans' top concerns. And Obama has a limited window to make progress on those matters in a second term, when lame-duck status can quickly creep up on presidents, particularly if they start losing public support.¶ Obama already is grappling with some of the lowest approval ratings of his presidency. A Pew Research Center/USA Today poll out this week put his approval at 44 percent. That's down from 55 percent at the end of 2012.¶ Potential military intervention in Syria also is deeply unpopular with many Americans, with a Pew survey finding that 63 percent opposing the idea. And the president's publicly shifting positions on how to respond to a deadly chemical weapons attack in Syria also have confused many Americans and congressional lawmakers.¶ "In times of crisis, the more clarity the better," said Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., a strong supporter of U.S. intervention in Syria. "This has been confusing. For those who are inclined to support the president, it's been pretty hard to nail down what the purpose of a military strike is."¶ For a time, the Obama administration appeared to be barreling toward an imminent strike in retaliation for the Aug. 21 chemical weapons attack. But Obama made a sudden reversal and instead decided to seek congressional approval for military action.¶ Even after administration officials briefed hundreds of lawmakers on classified intelligence, there appeared to be limited backing for a use-of-force resolution on Capitol Hill. Rather than face defeat, Obama asked lawmakers this week to postpone any votes while the U.S. explores the viability of a deal to secure Syria's chemical weapons stockpiles.¶ That pause comes as a relief to Obama and many Democrats eager to return to issues more in line with the public's concerns. The most pressing matters are a Sept. 30 deadline to approve funding to keep the government open — the new fiscal year begins Oct. 1 — and the start of sign-ups for health care exchanges, a crucial element of the health care overhaul.¶ On Wednesday, a revolt by tea party conservatives forced House Republican leaders to delay a vote on a temporary spending bill written to head off a government shutdown. Several dozen staunch conservatives are seeking to couple the spending bill with a provision to derail implementation of the health care law.¶ The White House also may face a fight with Republicans over raising the nation's debt ceiling this fall. While Obama has insisted he won't negotiate over the debt limit, House Speaker John Boehner on Thursday said the GOP will insist on curbing spending.

#### Drains capital – Backlash and hostage taking on unrelated priority legislation is empirically proven, likely in future and specifically true for Rubio – Cuba policy is totally unique – this is the best link card you will ever read

LeoGrande, 12

William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.

#### This will destroy the U.S. and global economy and collapse trade

Davidson, 9/10 (Adam - co-founder of NPR’s “Planet Money” 9/10/2013, “Our Debt to Society,” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=0))

This is the definition of a deficit, and it illustrates why the government needs to borrow money almost every day to pay its bills. Of course, all that daily borrowing adds up, and we are rapidly approaching what is called the X-Date — the day, somewhere in the next six weeks, when the government, by law, cannot borrow another penny. Congress has imposed a strict limit on how much debt the federal government can accumulate, but for nearly 90 years, it has raised the ceiling well before it was reached. But since a large number of Tea Party-aligned Republicans entered the House of Representatives, in 2011, raising that debt ceiling has become a matter of fierce debate. This summer, House Republicans have promised, in Speaker John Boehner’s words, “a whale of a fight” before they raise the debt ceiling — if they even raise it at all.If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted again this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). In the case of the United States, though, it won’t be an isolated national crisis. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be, by most accounts, the largest self-imposed financial disaster in history. Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency. Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse far worse than anything we’ve seen in the past several years. Instead, Robert Auwaerter, head of bond investing for Vanguard, the world’s largest mutual-fund company, told me that the collapse might be more insidious. “You know what happens when the market gets upset?” he said. “There’s a flight to quality. Investors buy Treasury bonds. It’s a bit perverse.” In other words, if the U.S. comes within shouting distance of a default (which Auwaerter is confident won’t happen), the world’s investors — absent a safer alternative, given the recent fates of the euro and the yen — might actually buy even more Treasury bonds. Indeed, interest rates would fall and the bond markets would soar. While this possibility might not sound so bad, it’s really far more damaging than the apocalyptic one I imagined. Rather than resulting in a sudden crisis, failure to raise the debt ceiling would lead to a slow bleed. Scott Mather, head of the global portfolio at Pimco, the world’s largest private bond fund, explained that while governments and institutions might go on a U.S.-bond buying frenzy in the wake of a debt-ceiling panic, they would eventually recognize that the U.S. government was not going through an odd, temporary bit of insanity. They would eventually conclude that it had become permanently less reliable. Mather imagines institutional investors and governments turning to a basket of currencies, putting their savings in a mix of U.S., European, Canadian, Australian and Japanese bonds. Over the course of decades, the U.S. would lose its unique role in the global economy.The U.S. benefits enormously from its status as global reserve currency and safe haven. Our interest and mortgage rates are lower; companies are able to borrow money to finance their new products more cheaply. As a result, there is much more economic activity and more wealth in America than there would be otherwise. If that status erodes, the U.S. economy’s peaks will be lower and recessions deeper; future generations will have fewer job opportunities and suffer more when the economy falters. And, Mather points out, no other country would benefit from America’s diminished status. When you make the base risk-free asset more risky, the entire global economy becomes riskier and costlier.

#### Nuclear war and extinction

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Increased Potential for Global Conflict

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. **Terrorism’s appeal will decline** if **economic growth continues** in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any **economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence** would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential **nuclear** rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to **increased tensions**, **rivalries**, and **counterbalancing moves**, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be **increasingly difficult** both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

### 2

#### Trade liberalization with Cuba kicks away the ladder to prevent successful Cuban development – causes neoliberal expansion and overconsumption – the alt is to de-link from latin america

Fanelli 8 (Carlo, SSHRC Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Department of Politics & Public Administration, Ryerson University, He received his PhD from the Department of Sociology & Anthropology at Carleton University, “‘Cubanalismo’: The Cuban Alternative to Neoliberalism”, *New Proposals*: Journal of Marxism and Interdisciplinary Inquiry Vol.2, No. 1 (November 2008) pgs. 7-16)

A closer look at the history of capitalism, however, reveals a much different story than the one being championed by supporters of neoliberalism (Chang 2003). For instance, the majority of today’s advanced industrialized countries of the Global North that are actively championing neoliberalism did not themselves in their early history practice free trade, the removal of tariffs and subsidies, or the retrenchment of the state in order to protect the private interests of capital. Instead, the US and UK, for instance, promoted their national industries through tariffs, subsidies, and an active and intervening role of the state into capitalist ventures (Chang 2003). “These two countries were, in fact, often the pioneers and frequently the most ardent users of interventionalist trade and industrial policy measures in their early stages of development” (Chang 2003:1). One potential explanation for this may be, as the nineteenth century German economist Friedrich List suggests: It is a very common clever device that when anyone has attained the summit of greatness, he kicks away the ladder by which he has climbed up, in order to deprive others of the means of climbing up after him. Any nation which by means of protective duties and restrictions of navigation has raised her manufacturing power and her navigation to such a degree of development that no other nation can sustain free competition with her, can do nothing wiser than to throw away these ladders of her greatness, to preach to other nations the benefits of free trade, and to declare the penitent tones that she has hitherto wandered in the paths of error, and has now for the first time succeeded in discovering the truth. [cited in Chang, 2003:5] If this is the case, as Chang (2003) proposes more than a century later, the historical evidence suggests that advocates of neoliberalism are indeed “kicking away the ladder” that they used to achieve their current level of development so that a very limited and chosen number of nations may reach relative parity. Debunking the neoliberal myth of free trade from the historical perspective demonstrates the paradox faced by neoliberal economists since the majority of underdeveloped nations in the Global South grew much faster when they used active interventionalist policies from 1960 to 1980, than when they did during the following two decades (Chang 2003). Given the history of capitalist development and the substantial differences that exist between what is preached and what is actually practiced, Cuba has chosen to follow its own path to development based not on free trade and laissez-faire economics, but on one centered on a state-led model of growth that emphasis the social and human responsibilities of economic relations. The three pillars of the Cuban economy are, first, state-led economic development; second, a high concentration of public sector employment; and third, a high degree of tariffs and subsidies in order to promote domestic production and consumption. Much like the early history of their neighbours to the north, Cubanalismo attempts to maintain high and stable trade barriers while protecting their infant industries in order to encourage domestic innovation and a strong industrial sector so as to be self-sufficient and shield the Cuban economy from whirlwind international markets. For the most part, Cuban economists and policy makers oversee the majority of economic activities and decisions. This allows the Cuban economy to remain flexible enough so as to adjust to international fluctuations and changing economic uncertainties both domestically and abroad. As Cuban manufacturing industries gained strength and self-dependence, Cuban officials gradually increased FDI throughout the 199 0s. What separates Cubanalismo from neoliberalism in this respect, is that Cuban officials allowed greater levels of FDI only after Cuban industries had become selfreliant so that they could “stand on their own feet” once productivity levels, efficiency, and quality had been more or less achieved.

#### Extinction---tech and reforms fail

Richard A. Smith 7, Research Associate at the Institute for Policy Research & Development, UK; PhD in History from UCLA, June 2007, “The Eco-suicidal Economics of Adam Smith,” Capitalism Nature Socialism, Vol. 18, No. 2, p. 22-43

In the midst of the record-breaking heat wave in the summer of 2003, George Monbiot, the renowned columnist for the London Guardian, penned a short but eloquent essay entitled "Sleepwalking to Extinction." Monbiot wrote: We live in a dreamworld. With a small, rational part of our brain, we recognize that our existence is . . . destroying the conditions for human life on earth. Were we governed by reason, we would be on the barricades today, dragging the drivers of Range Rovers and Nissan Patrols out of their seats, occupying and shutting down the coal-burning power stations, bursting in upon the Blairs' retreat from reality in Barbados and demanding a reversal of economic life as dramatic as the one we bore when we went to war with Hitler.1 But despite the frightening trends and increasingly desperate pleas from the world's scientists, the world's corporate and political leadership show no sign of abandoning denial and adopting "reason" nor scrapping business-as-usual to mobilize against catastrophe. The ritual has now become depressingly familiar and predictable: After each new "shocking" report on melting icecaps, the slowing Gulf Stream in the North Atlantic, or eco-devastation in Africa or China, "concerned" politicians call for "immediate action" and "drastic steps" to curb emissions but then do nothing of substance. Successive post-Kyoto talks begin with urgent pleas from devastated Third World peasants and expert scientists, then collapse in disagreement. At every turn, the priority of growth and profits overrides every ringing alarm, and society carries on in its "sleepwalk to extinction." In the latest rehearsal of this charade, the United Nations talks on climate change in Nairobi in November 2006 collapsed with no firm targets adopted and every issue of any seriousness postponed yet again. Then-UN secretary-General, Kofi Annan, decried the assembled ministers as "frighteningly timid," "lacking in leadership" and said they displayed "a failure of political will." One Greenpeace observer remarked that "the glaciers in Greenland are moving faster than the negotiators."2 The Nairobi session came just after Britain's Treasury secretary and former World Bank chief economist, Sir Nicholas Stern, sounded the latest alarm with his own blistering report laying down a challenge to Britain, the U.S., and developing nations like China and India that the planet faces imminent catastrophe unless urgent measures are taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions immediately. Stern's warning went beyond restating an apocalyptic vision of hundreds of millions fleeing floods and drought; it struck at the heart of the corporate resistance to environmental measures by demonstrating that the cost of inaction could result in the permanent loss of perhaps 20 percent of global output, while the cost of preventive action right now is as little as 1 to 2 percent of global gross national product (GNP). By illustrating the huge economic cost that inaction will impose on the industrialized economies, Stern's report should have knocked the last leg out from under the "environment versus economy" argument. Reiterating the conclusions of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) scientists, Stern warned that just to stabilize CO2 and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at between 450 and 500 parts per million, we will have to cut global emissions by 25 percent and wealthy country emissions by 60 percent by 2050. Presenting the findings in London, Prime Minister Tony Blair said the consequences of inaction were "literally disastrous" and warned: This disaster is not set to happen in some science fiction future many years ahead in our lifetime. We can't wait the five years it took to negotiate Kyoto-we simply don't have the time . . . Without radical measures to reduce carbon dioxide emissions in the next ten to fifteen years, there is compelling evidence to suggest that we might lose the chance to control temperature rises."3 The Stern report came just as the International Energy Agency announced that China, which is commissioning a new coal-fired power plant every five days, will surpass the United States in 2009-nearly a decade ahead of previous predictions-as the world's biggest emitter of carbon dioxide.4 Largely because of China's growth, the Global Carbon Project reported in the November 13, 2006 issue of Nature that "Global carbon emissions are now growing by 3.2 percent a year... That's four times higher than the average annual growth of 0.8 percent from 1990-1999 . . . We are not on any of the stabilization paths." Professor Bill McGuire, director of the Benfield Hazard Research Center in London, said: "This is more very bad news. We need a 60 to 70 percent cut in emissions, but instead, emission levels are spiraling out of control. The sum total of our meager efforts to cut emissions amounts to less than zero."5 The Necessity of Hypocrisy So what sort of "radical measures to reduce carbon dioxide emissions in the next ten to fifteen years" do Blair and Stern propose to stop this onrushing catastrophe? None. After all their rhetoric about impending disaster, the best they could do was call for more "carbon pricing," "more research into new technologies," and "robust international agreements." They specifically rejected mandatory limits on emissions as "too inflexible" and-most crucially-have nothing whatsoever to say about the implications of inexorable growth. On the face of it, this was a completely inadequate response to the crisis, and Blair was immediately chastised by his own party for resisting binding targets.6 After all, carbon pricing schemes, notably in the EU, have already proved to be a colossal failure since economic growth has just barreled through the Kyoto carbon "limits." And what possible technical breakthroughs could cut global CO2 emissions by 60 percent, particularly in the ten-to-fifteen-year timeframe Blair says we must act in order to save ourselves, when China is adding a new coal-fired power plant every week and coal-fired plants are still being built in the United States.7 Nearly everywhere, we see that despite the increased energy efficiency and installation of pollution controls in cars or power plants, without limits to growth these gains are outstripped by ever-increasing production. So instead of CO2 emissions falling, globally emissions are actually accelerating.8 And CO2 emissions are only one-and perhaps not the even the worst-of the oncoming ecological catastrophes we face. Around the world, forests are also vanishing, clean water is disappearing, coral reefs are dying off, species after species is being driven to extinction, resource after resource is being exhausted; everywhere the natural world is being systematically plundered and sacrificed to the god of relentless growth, profits and consumption.9 The Inconvenient Truth Al Gore Does Not Want to Face Blair's contradictions are entirely predictable, rational, and necessary from the standpoint of his capitalist perspective, because the problems he faces are systemic, built into the logic of capitalist economics, and thus unsolvable within the framework of capitalism. The solution to the threat of global warming is obvious: The only way to cut emissions by 60 to 70 percent in the next ten to fifteen years-barring some as yet unknown technical miracle-is by drastically cutting production, output and consumption, particularly in the advanced industrial economies. Al Gore says we face an "inconvenient truth": consume less, conserve more-or die. The problem is the admonition to consume less has to translate into the reality of consuming less-less oil, electricity, steel, aluminum, wood, paper, plastic, fabric, beef, fish, and so on. That, in turn, can only mean producing fewer cars, airplanes, kitchen remodels, fashions, resort vacations, TVs and TV shows, hamburgers and Starbucks Frappuccinos-i.e., converting less of nature into consumable commodities to give a break to the fish, forests, oceans, atmosphere, and all the other natural resources exploited to support the capitalist consumer lifestyle. This is the really inconvenient truth that no investor, labor union, government, mainstream environmental organization, nor anyone of us-including Al Gore-wants to face.10 But this is the truth we have to face if we want to survive. Despite the difficulty such a massive challenge poses, it does not mean that people have to starve. On the contrary, if we do not make these cuts and restructure the global economy, not only will millions soon die from starvation, floods, drought and other catastrophes, but the capitalist engine of ecodestruction will drive humanity to the brink of collapse, if not extinction. The problem is, given the requirements of capitalist reproduction, particularly the need to meet shareholder demands for growing profits, no corporation can cut production and stay in business. Furthermore, any broad effort to slow production and consumption would only bring on market collapse and economic depression. So, as long as Blair, Stern, Al Gore, and the rest of the corporate and political elite are committed to maintaining and perpetuating global capitalism as their first and foremost priority, they have no choice but to subordinate the environment to growth and consumption, override their own environmental targets, turn themselves into hypocrites, and doom the future of humanity. To imagine, as they do, that technical innovations, carbon taxes, "green shopping" and the like will allow production and consumption to spiral endlessly upward and consume evermore resources while pollution and emissions spiral downward is to live in a delusional dreamworld of faith-based economics that has no empirical basis.11 Through most of human history up to around the 17th century, humanity suffered from class structures that put brakes on productivity growth, institutionalized underproduction as a regular feature of economic life, and so brought on periodic famines and demographic collapse. But since the advent of the capitalist mode of production, humanity has both benefited-but also increasingly suffered-from the opposite problem: crises and consequences of overproduction, which have typically taken the form of economic crashes and depression. Today, this engine of relentless technological revolution and productivity growth has built an economy of such power, capacity and scale that it is systematically destroying the very ecological basis of human life. The Smithian Operating System To understand why the free market can't solve our global environmental crisis, the place to start is with an examination of the logic and contradictions of capitalist economics-the economics of Adam Smith. Needless to say, Smith can't be held responsible for the problems and consequences of capitalist development. But Smith's economic theory is a metonym - the language of capitalism, its intellectual "operating system." For it was Smith, the original and foremost theorist of capitalism, who first discovered and elaborated the organizing principle of capitalist economic life, which he famously termed the "invisible hand." Smith found it remarkable that in what he called "commercial society" (what we today call capitalism), no one looks out for the "general welfare" of society as such. Yet somehow, the provision of the necessities of life-e.g., enough food, clothes, housing, and transportation-so that society can carry on from day-to-day and year-to-year seems to more or less unconsciously get taken care of. In some of the most famous phrases in all of economic literature Smith asserted: In almost every other race of animals each individual, when it grows up to maturity, is entirely independent, and in its natural state has occasion for the assistance of no other living creature. But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and shew them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want . . . and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages . . . (Smith, Wealth of Nations, Book 1, Chapter 1, p. 14.)12 And again that: Every individual . . . neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it . . . He intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. (Smith, Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Chapter II, p. 423.)13 Smith's insight, one of the most powerful and elegant concepts in the history of capitalist economics, grasps the essence of the market system-namely, production for exchange, specialized division of labor, and mutual dependence of all producers/commodity sellers/consumers upon one another through the market. This is what distinguishes the market system from all previous economic systems, such as communal tribal society, slavery, and feudalism-all of which were, in one way or another, systems based overwhelmingly on direct production for use rather than for exchange. For example, in pre-capitalist economic systems like medieval agrarian Europe, farm production was planned and largely for direct use. The basic unit of rural production was the peasant family with its farm, rudimentary tools and livestock. Peasant farmers not only grew their own food but often made their own clothes, fabricated most of their own tools, and built their own houses. Peasants produced mostly for subsistence and, where they were enserfed, to pay rents to feudal landlords, tithes to the church, and sometimes additional obligations to the state. Beyond this, those who could produce and retain some surplus over subsistence, rent, and tithe obligations sold it in local town markets to procure the few necessities they could not produce for themselves on the farm or in the lord's demesne shops, such as metal for plows or tools. In the villages, patriarchal family households organized the day-to-day operations of farm life, determining which crops to grow and when, and assigning a division of labor within the family. They planned this production based on their foreknowledge of what their family unit needed to carry on from year-to-year-how much and what kinds of crops and animals to raise, and how much labor to devote to farming, husbandry, and building upkeep. More often than not, because village agricultural regimes required village-wide cooperation to regulate seasonal plantings, field rotations, harvest, and commons management, peasant farmers collectively planned and regulated their seasonal work rhythms in cooperation with their neighbors according to the custom and village bylaws in tightknit village communities. Throughout Europe, most rural agrarian output was directly consumed on the farm, in the hamlets and villages. The feudal aristocracy consumed the surpluses directly and marketed some of their surpluses in urban markets to purchase luxury goods and military equipment. In short, rural Europe, at least up to the 15th century, was in a sense a "planned" economy-or more precisely, consisted of masses of miniature planned village economies.14 By Adam Smith's day in the late 18th century, rural peasant village self-sufficiency with its limited division of labor had largely given way to generalized production for market throughout England and parts of Western Europe. In this new "commercial" economy, Smith observed there is no general economic "plan." No one plans production for the self-sufficient family anymore. Production is now specialized and geared for the whole society-and it is to society that one must turn to satisfy one's own needs. No one knows how much wheat or wool, how many shoes, coats, ships, or wagons society needs, or when they are needed. No one consciously divides up and assigns society's labor to the various tasks of producing all that society requires over any given period of time.15 And yet out of the unconscious "mindlessness" of this system, a spontaneous order emerges. Society seems to be "guided by an invisible hand" to produce more or less of these goods so that we can carry on from day-to-day to ensure social reproduction. By the developing 18th-century capitalist economy of Adam Smith's era, most producers no longer possessed their own means of subsistence, or at least full subsistence. Masses of peasant farmers had been cleared off the land and proletarianized by centuries of enclosure movements. Peasant subsistence farms, with all their variety of produce, had been replaced with wheat farms or sheep folds. The hand loom weaver, village blacksmith and most small-scale hand manufacturers were giving way to large-scale factory production with a specialized division of labor and, increasingly in the late 18th century, mechanization. Without full access to the means of subsistence, everyone in capitalist society must specialize to produce a commodity for market or sell their labor power to work for an employer who does possess the means of production.16 So to win one's own bread in the capitalist organization of production, virtually everyone, including the capitalists, must continuously sell their specialized commodity on the market in order to continuously purchase their own means of subsistence and the means of production to re-enter production.17 In this way, all commodity producers/sellers are dependent upon the labor of others.18 How do these specialist commodity producers/sellers know in advance how much of their particular commodity-wheat, cloth, bricks, horseshoes, board feet of lumber, barrels, etc.-society "needs" in any given year or how much they will sell? They don't. Typically they estimate from what they sold the previous year, and hope to sell their product for at least as low a price as others offering the same commodity. Thus, society's "need" for any particular commodity is determined after the fact by the price at which it sells, what Smith called "effectual demand." If demand and prices are high for some particular commodity, Smith says producers will "employ more labor and stock in preparing and bringing it to market." If demand falls, producers will "withdraw a part of their labor or stock from this employment" and redeploy those resources in some other line of production.19 So if the market is glutted with wheat, but wool is in short supply and prices are high, some farmers will turn to raising sheep. If demand is low for ships but high for houses, some carpenters will switch from building ships to building houses. And so on, until the supply and demand come roughly into balance, what economists today call "equilibrium."20 That's the beauty and efficiency of the market system, as mainstream economists never tire of telling us. Engine of Development: Production for Exchange and its Imperatives This mutual dependence of each and every person through the market entrains a number of powerful implications. Foremost among these are the implications that flow from competition in the marketplace. Commodity sellers don't have the freedom to charge what they wish, because they must be able to sell at prices close to the competition if they are to compete. The specific strategies and methods producers must adopt to survive against the competition shape the overall pattern of economic development of capitalism as a system and also distinguish it from every other economic system: Producers must strive to cut the cost of inputs, which means seeking out ever-cheaper sources of raw materials and labor. Producers must continuously increase the efficiency of their units of production by innovating, bringing in more advanced labor-saving machinery to boost productivity, and substituting newer and cheaper raw materials inputs. So unlike the ruling classes of pre-capitalist economies, capitalists are not free to consume their surpluses in conspicuous consumption but must reinvest much of their profits back into productivity-enhancing technologies and skills to develop the forces of production. Competition compels producers to strive to grow by maximizing sales, expanding existing markets, seeking out and creating new markets and commodities-or see them developed by the competition, and thus see their stock value fall as the penalty for complacency. As eloquent as Adam Smith was, no one captured the broader developmental implications of capitalist economics better than Karl Marx. In some of the most prescient phrases in all of economic literature, Marx wrote in his Communist Manifesto: The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society ... Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned . . . The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of Nature's forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalization of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground - what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labor?21 By comparison, pre-capitalist modes of production contained no such engine of development or drive to "constantly revolutionize" the instruments and relations of production. Technological advance under slavery and feudalism was agonizingly slow, and economic stagnation was the norm. When productivity growth could not keep pace with population growth, economic collapse and famine followed. Even the Stalinist bureaucratic mode of production in Russia and China contained no such built-in drive to development. Post-revolutionary Russia and China rapidly developed and industrialized to a considerable extent, but the bureaucratic system was not powered by any self-active motor. Development depended entirely on the conscious actions and direction of central planners, but for the same reason, it was also severely limited and handicapped by the bureaucracy's inability to push development beyond certain limits. In particular, these bureaucrats lacked the weapons of unemployment and bankruptcy to discipline producers, force productivity increases, or generate innovation and development.22 Without competition to force producers to innovate and become more efficient, top-down bureaucratically driven development was no match for the dynamic growth of global capitalism. This engine of development has brought the most prodigious development of the forces of production of any mode of production in history, lifting the living standards of billions of people the world over. So it was no surprise that since the spectacular collapse of communism and the global triumph of capitalism in the 1990s, Smithian economics has been crowned with a sacred halo, unquestioned and self-evident to the churched.23 Today, Smith's theory, rebranded for today's market under the neoclassical and neoliberal labels, is entrenched in every economics department from Berkeley to Beijing. Engine of Planetary Eco-collapse: The Collective Irrationality of Individualist Economics In his 1996 book The Future of Capitalism, Lester Thurow lucidly captured the socially suicidal aggregate impact of individualistic economic decision-making: Nowhere is capitalism's time horizon problem more acute than in the area of global environmentalism .. . What should a capitalistic society do about long-run environmental problems such as global warming or ozone depletion? . .. Using capitalist decision rules, the answer to what should be done today to prevent such problems is very clear-do nothing. However large the negative effects fifty to one hundred years from now might be, their current discounted net present value is zero. If the current value of the future negative consequences are zero, then nothing should be spent today to prevent those distant problems from emerging. But if the negative effects are very large fifty to one hundred years from now, by then it will be too late to do anything to make the situation any better, since anything done at that time could only improve the situation another fifty to one hundred years into the future. So being good capitalists, those who live in the future, no matter how bad their problems are, will also decide to do nothing. Eventually a generation will arrive which cannot survive in the earth's altered environment, but by then it will be too late for them to do anything to prevent their own extinction. Each generation makes good capitalist decisions, yet the net effect is collective social suicide.24 Lester Thurow, virtually alone among mainstream economists as near as I can tell, has recognized this potentially fatal contradiction of capitalism-even though he is no anti-capitalist and wrote the book from which this excerpt is drawn in the hopes of finding a future for capitalism. Until very recently, the standard economics textbooks ignored the problem of the environment altogether. Even today, the standard Economics 101 textbooks of Baro, Mankiv and other mainstream economists contain almost no mention of environment or ecology.25 This reflects the increasingly rightward drift of the discipline since the 1970s. The American economics profession has long since abandoned the practice of critical scientific thought and seriously considering dissenting views. Today, an almost totalitarian "neoliberal" religious dogma rules the discipline. Keynesianism, social democracy, and Marxism are dismissed as hopelessly antiquated. Ecological economics is considered suspect. And the prudent graduate student is well advised to steer clear of all such interests if he or she wants to find a job.26 As Francis Fukuyama put it some years back, history has reached its penultimate apogee in free market capitalism and liberal democracy. The science of economics, Fukuyama pronounced, was "settled" with Adam Smith's accomplishment. The future would bring no more than "endless technical adjustments;" thus no further theoretical thought is required."27

### 3

#### Economic engagement is a conditional QPQ

Shinn 96 [James Shinn, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia at the CFR in New York City and director of the council’s multi-year Asia Project, worked on economic affairs in the East Asia Bureau of the US Dept of State, “Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China,” pp. 9 and 11, google books]

In sum, conditional engagement consists of a set of objectives, a strategy for attaining those objectives, and tactics (specific policies) for implementing that strategy.

* The objectives of conditional engagement are the ten principles, which were selected to preserve American vital interests in Asia while accommodating China’s emergence as a major power.
* The overall strategy of conditional engagement follows two parallel lines: economic engagement, to promote the integration of China into the global trading and financial systems; and security engagement, to encourage compliance with the ten principles by diplomatic and military means when economic incentives do not suffice, in order to hedge against the risk of the emergence of a belligerent China.
* The tactics of economic engagementshouldpromote China’s economic integration through negotiationsontrade liberalization, institution building, and educational exchanges. While a carrots-and-sticks approach may be appropriate within the economic arena, the use of trade sanction to achieve short-term political goals is discouraged.
* The tactics of security engagement should reduce the risks posed by China’s rapid military expansion, its lack of transparency, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational problems such as crime and illegal migration, by engaging in arms control negotiations, multilateral efforts, and a loosely-structured defensive military arrangement in Asia.8

[To footnotes]

8. Conditional engagement’s recommended tactics of tit-for-tat responses are equivalent to using carrots and sticks in response to foreign policy actions by China. Economic engagement calls for what is described as symmetric tit-for-tat and security engagement for asymmetric tit-for-tat. A symmetric response is one that counters a move by China in the same place, time, and manner; an asymmetric response might occur in another place at another time, and perhaps in another manner. A symmetric tit-for-tat would be for Washington to counter a Chinese tariff of 10 percent on imports for the United States with a tariff of 10 percent on imports from China. An asymmetric tit-for-tat would be for the United States to counter a Chines shipment of missiles to Iran with an American shipment of F-16s to Vietnam (John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, (1982). This is also cited in FareedZakaria, “The Reagan Strategy of Containment,” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 3 (1990), pp. 383-88).

Vote negative

a) Limits – policies the embargo means there’s a near-infinite range of “one exception” affs

b) Ground – unconditional engagement denies us “say no” and backlash arguments which are a crucial part of the engagement debate

### 4

Text: The United States federal government should propose to the Organization of American States a multilateral effort to substantially repeal its economic sanctions on Cuba.

#### It solves the AFF and bolsters the OAS

IAD 12 (Inter-American Dialogue, US center for policy analysis, exchange, and communication on issues in Western Hemisphere affairs, the Dialogue brings together public and private leaders from across the Americas to address hemispheric problems and opportunities, fourteen Dialogue members served as presidents of their countries and more than two dozen have served at the cabinet level“Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” Inter-American Dialogue Policy Report, p. 17-18, April 2012, <http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf>)

Even as Latin America expands its global reach and presence, it is important that the United States and the region increase their attention to reshaping regional institutions to better align them with current realities and challenges and to make them more effective. The hemisphere’s institutional architecture is in great flux, and there is growing need for decisions about priorities and objectives. The Organization of American States, the world’s oldest regional institution, has come under enormous stress as a result of the rapidly shifting political and economic context of hemispheric relations. It is still the region’s main political organization, with legitimacy to work across a spectrum of issues, but it is badly in need of institutional reform, perhaps even a re-launching. For all its problems, the OAS has a singular capacity to take on critical issues, including human rights, press freedom, and democracy, that other, newer multilateral mechanisms seem years away from being able to handle adequately. New groupings—like UNASUR and CELAC—may have key roles to fulfill, but no institution can yet match the normative frameworks developed over decades in the OAS. Regional organizations focused on finance and development have emerged from the transformations stronger than their political counterparts. This may be because there is greater consensus on economic management than political questions. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has gone through a difficult reform process, while the CAF— Development Bank of Latin America, with only Latin American members, has expanded considerably in recent years and extended its lending throughout the region. Although not strictly a regional institution, Brazil’s National Development Bank has sharply increased its funding outside Brazil, chiefly to support foreign investments by Brazilian companies on infrastructure and energy projects in neighboring countries. It is encouraging how constructively Washington has responded to Latin America’s growing independence and greater assertiveness in regional and global affairs. It has readily accommodated the hemisphere’s emerging institutional landscape even though that includes new regional groupings from which the United States is excluded. Less encouraging, but indicative of its shrinking political and diplomatic profile in the region, is the reduced US commitment to and active engagement in some regional arrangements to which it does belong, among them the OAS and the Summit of the Americas. As the OAS goes through a troubled period, it must have stronger engagement from member governments, including effective involvement by the United States, in order to regain a central role in inter-American affairs.

#### Everyone says yes

Erickson 10 (Daniel P. Erikson, associate for US policy¶ and director of Caribbean programs at the Inter-American¶ Dialogue, taught Latin American politics at Johns Hopkins-SAIS, is¶ frequently interviewed in US and international media, and has¶ testified before the US Congress, his past positions include¶ research associate at Harvard Business School and Fulbright¶ scholar in US-Mexican business relations, he is also a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations, “The Obama Administration and Latin America: Towards a New Partnership?” Working Paper No. 46, The Centre for International Governance Innovation, April 2010, pg. 27, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Working\_Paper%2046.pdf

Although the early hopes for momentous change have¶ begun to dissipate, the presidency of Barack Obama still has¶ the potential to bring about an important restructuring of inter-¶ American relations. In retrospect, the initial warm glow of good¶ feelings was always destined to give way to a more pragmatic¶ understanding on both sides of the relationship regarding the¶ possibilities and limits of what the US and Latin America can¶ expect of each other. But throughout the Americas, the desire¶ remains that Barack Obama will be attentive and respectful to¶ the region’s concerns. The 44th president of the United States¶ has already pledged to keep an open mind and demonstrate a¶ willingness to listen. The next step is to advance the strategy¶ of substantive, issue-oriented engagement that can sustain the¶ goodwill that so much of the hemisphere felt upon his election¶ to the White House.

### Global Influence

#### The liberal international order ensures a transition is peaceful regardless of US engagement

Ikenberry 11 (G. John, “A World of Our Making: The international order that America created will endure—if we make the transition to a grand strategy based on reciprocity and shared leadership.” G. John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He is also Co-Director of Princeton’s Center for International Security Studies. Ikenberry is also a Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, Korea. In 2013-2014 Ikenberry will be the 72nd Eastman Visiting Professor at Balliol College, Oxford. <http://www.democracyjournal.org/21/a-world-of-our-making-1.php?page=2>)

Second, the character of liberal international order itself—with or without American hegemonic leadership—reinforces continuity. The complex interdependence that is unleashed in an open and loosely rule-based order generates expanding realms of exchange and investment that result in a growing array of firms, interest groups, and other sorts of political stakeholders who seek to preserve the stability and openness of the system. Beyond this, the liberal order is also relatively easy to join. In the post-Cold War decades, countries in different regions of the world have made democratic transitions and connected themselves to various parts of this system. East European countries and states within the old Soviet empire have joined NATO. East Asian countries, including China, have joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). Through its many multilateral institutions, the liberal international order facilitates integration and offers support for states that are making transitions toward liberal democracy. Many countries have also experienced growth and rising incomes within this order. Comparing international orders is tricky, but the current liberal international order, seen in comparative perspective, does appear to have unique characteristics that encourage integration and discourage opposition and resistance.

#### Including non-democratic institutions in the world order impairs the world’s ability to make decisions and deals—non-democracies inherently undermine world decision-making—relative levels of cooperation have no impact

Ásgeirsdóttir and Steinwand Feb-28-12 “Drawing the Line: The Use of Equidistance versus Equitable Distribution in Demarcating Shared Ocean Areas,” Áslaug Ásgeirsdóttir is an Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Politics at Bates College, Martin Steinwand is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Stony Brook University, <http://mysbfiles.stonybrook.edu/~msteinwand/papers/AsgeirsdottirSteinwand.2012.pdf>)

At first glance, we see that the regime type variables are statistically significant, while ¶ variables related to relative power, and gains from cooperation through trade do not affect the ¶ probability of settlement. Signature of the Law of the Sea has a significant effect, as have ¶ territorial disputes. ¶ Looking at the regime type variables in more detail, we find that a pair of democracies has a ¶ slightly increased chance of coming to an agreement relative to the reference category (the ¶ reference category consists of all pairs of countries involving mixed regime types). The predicted ¶ increase in the probability of a settlement is 1.79 percentage points. The selection equation does ¶ not have a great fit. The highest predicted probability of reform is 18 percent. For our baseline ¶ configuration with all variables at their medians, the predicted probability is 3.21 percent. Thus, ¶ on this low basis, pairs of democracies increase the probability of reform relative to dyads ¶ involving mixed regime types by about a half.¶ In contrast, pairs of autocracies and democratic-autocratic dyads suppress the probability ¶ of coming to an agreement. For two autocracies, the chances drop by 4.35 percentage points, and ¶ for democratic – autocratic pairs by 2.96 percentage points. Thus, having an autocracy involved ¶ reduces the probability of agreement close to zero.¶ Together, these finding provide evidence that in dealing with each other, democracies are ¶ better able to find mutually agreeable bargains. This relative efficiency disappears when one of ¶ the parties is a non-democracy. The dyadic nature of this effect is in line with theoretical ¶ approaches that highlight the role of domestic audience costs in facilitating international ¶ cooperation. However, we cannot distinguish audience costs from other causal mechanisms ¶ realize negative probabilities.20¶ operating on democracies, such as the role of domestic constraints. Still, our analysis shows ¶ strong evidence that democracies are better at bargaining with each other.

#### Status quo solves Obama credibility

Charles A. Kupchan – YOUR AUTHOR – 12, professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and the Whitney Shepardson senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Bruce W. Jentleson, professor of public policy and political science at Duke University, October/November 2012, “Obama’s strong suit,” http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/The%20World%20Today/2012/october/WT1012Kupchan.pdf

When it comes to handling matters of America’s national security, Republicans have for decades commanded much more public confidence than Democrats. Not any longer. President Barack Obama has effectively cornered the market on foreign and defence policy, leaving Team Romney on the defensive, struggling to land punches on Obama’s record.¶ In his acceptance speech at the Republican Convention in August, Mitt Romney devoted scant time to foreign policy, effectively an admission that national security is not the Republicans’ strong suit. When they do try to score points against Obama, Republicans say that his leadership has been weak and vacillating. They claim that instead of celebrating America’s exceptional history and superior strength, Obama apologises for US hegemony and is too accommodating of challenges to US power.¶ Republicans mistake prudence for weakness. Obama’s statecraft may lack the hard edges and black-and-white absolutes of his predecessor’s, but the abandonment of ideological excess in favour of principled pragmatism is, perhaps, the greatest asset of Obama’s diplomacy. Washington is again embracing a brand of leadership based on engagement and persuasion rather than coercion and bravado. In this vein, Obama’s readiness to talk to adversaries is not, as Republicans would have it, naïve appeasement; it is savvy diplomacy aimed at taming longstanding rivalries.¶ Obama’s formula for exercising American leadership rests on striking a balance between power and partnership geared to the dynamic nature of this 21st century world. The Bush administration relied too heavily on power and bluster alone – a mistake that Romney seems all too prepared to repeat – failing to understand that brute force and intimidation often do more to invite resistance than acquiescence. Instead, Obama has adhered to a centrist brand of US internationalism that provides leadership through teamwork and consensus building, relying on coercion only as a last resort.¶ Obama’s embrace of multilateralism has shored up America’s alliances around the globe. Allies again feel like partners that matter, not objects of American power. Opinion surveys reveal that in many countries, people hold much more positive views of the United States today than they did during the Bush era. Meanwhile, Washington has repaired its tarnished relationship with international institutions, including the UN and NATO. All told, one of Obama’s signature accomplishments is the reclamation, at home and abroad, of the legitimacy of American power and purpose.¶ While emphasizing the value of partnership, Obama has by no means dismissed the need for power; he is anything but gun shy, as made clear by the killing of Osama bin Laden and Washington’s regular use of drone strikes against terrorist targets. Indeed, when it comes to countering the terrorist threat, Obama’s resort to ‘smart power’ has proved far more effective and much less costly than George W. Bush’s ‘global war on terrorism’.¶ At the same time, Obama understands the limits of US power. He withdrew from Iraq on schedule, and is in the midst of handing over to Afghans responsibility for managing their country. The primary objective of the US military – the effective elimination of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan – has been achieved. The Afghan government and its security forces are admittedly not yet as developed as they should be, and the Taliban have proved more resilient than expected. But without more capable and co-operative partners in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, it makes little sense for the United States and its coalition partners to extend the military mission. Delaying the American withdrawal, as Romney has indicated he would do, is to divorce strategy from realities on the ground.¶ As to Obama’s readiness to engage adversaries, Washington’s outreach is neither appeasement nor an apology for American hegemony; it is good diplomacy. Relations between Moscow and Washington have been more difficult of late, in no small part due to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s alignment with the Syrian government and his crackdown on the political opposition at home. But the ‘reset’ between Russia and the United States has yielded significant progress on a number of important issues, including nuclear arms control, Afghanistan, and diplomacy with Iran. Patient engagement with Myanmar has paid off; diplomatic and commercial contacts have deepened in step with political liberalization.

#### No war – China abides by international law and keeps a low profile

Haixia 12 (Qi, Lecturer at Department of International Relations – Tsinghua University, “Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: China–US Intensifying Rivalry Does not Amount to Cold War,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5(2), Summer, p. 105-127, http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/2/105.full)

Keeping Low Profile China's strategy of keeping low profile constitutes the political foundation of the superficial friendship between the United States and China. After 1989, in the face of sanctions and blockades from the West, Deng Xiaoping told Chinese policy makers: ‘In short, my views about the international situation can be summed up in three sentences. First, we should observe the situation coolly. Second, we should hold our ground. Third, we should act camly. Don’t be impatient; it is no good to be impatient. We should be calm, calm and again calm, and quietly immerse ourselves in practical work to accomplish something – something for China.’48 Deng Xiaoping's counterstrategy was later summed up as ‘keeping a low profile’. It was in 1995 that then Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen first introduced this principle of Chinese policy to the world.49 In 1998, President Jiang Zemin summarized the policy as ‘observe calmly, cope with affairs calmly, never seek leadership, hide brightness and cherish obscurity, get some things done.’50 The white paper on China's Peaceful Development issued in 2011 notes that, ‘As a responsible member of the international community, China abides by international law and the generally recognized principles governing international relations, and eagerly fulfills its international responsibility. China has actively participated in reforming international systems, formulating international rules and addressing global issues. It supports the development of other developing countries, and works to safeguard world peace and stability.’51

**History proves no risk of China war – their cards are all hype**

**Dyer 9** (Gwynne, Ph.D. in War Studies – University of London and Board of Governors – Canada’s Royal Military College, “China Unlikely to Engage in Military Confrontation”, Jakarta Post, 4-29,

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/03/12/china-unlikely-engage-military-confrontation.html)

Given America's monopoly or huge technological lead in key areas like stealth bombers, aircraft carriers, long-range sensors, satellite surveillance and even infantry body armor, Goss's warning is misleading and self-serving. China cannot project a **serious military force** even 200 miles (km) from home, while American forces utterly dominate China's ocean frontiers, many thousands of miles (kilometers) from the United States. But the drumbeat of warnings about China's ""military build-up"" continues. Just the other week U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was worrying again about the expansion of the Chinese navy, which is finally building some amphibious landing ships half a century after Beijing's confrontation with the non-Communist regime on the island of Taiwan began. And Senator Richard Lugar, head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, warned that if the European Union ends its embargo on arms sales to China, the U.S. would stop military technology sales to Europe. It will come as no surprise, therefore, that the major U.S. defense review planned for this year will concentrate on the rising ""threat"" from China, or that this year for the first time the joint U.S.-Japanese defense policy statement named China as a ""security concern"", or that the Taiwan government urged the ""military encirclement"" of China to prevent any ""foreign adventures"" by Beijing. It comes as no surprise -- but it still makes no sense. China's defense budget this year is 247.7 billion yuan: Around US$30 billion at the official exchange rate. There are those in Washington who will say that it's more like $60 billion in purchasing power, but then there used to be ""experts"" who annually produced hugely inflated and frightening estimates of the Soviet defense budget. Such people will always exist: to justify a big U.S. defense budget, you need a big threat. It's true that 247.7 billion yuan buys an awful lot of warm bodies in military uniform in the low-wage Chinese economy, but it doesn't actually buy much more in the way of high-tech military systems. It's also true that the Chinese defense budget has grown by double-digit increases for the past fourteen years: This year it's up by 12.6 percent. But that is not significantly faster than the Chinese economy as a whole is growing, and it's about what you have to spend in order to convert what used to be a glorified peasant militia into a modern military force. It would be astonishing if China chose NOT to modernize its armed forces as the rest of the economy modernizes, and the end result is not going to be a military machine that towers above all others. If you project the current growth rates of military spending in China and the United States into the future, China's defense budget catches up with the United States about the same time that its Gross Domestic Product does, in the late 2030s or the early 2040s. As to China's strategic intentions, the record of the past is reassuring in several respects. China has almost **never been militarily expansionist** beyond the traditional boundaries of the Middle Kingdom (which do include Tibet in the view of most Chinese), and its border clashes with India, the Soviet Union and Vietnam in the first decades of Communist rule generally ended with a voluntary Chinese withdrawal from the disputed territories. **The same moderation has** usually **applied in nuclear matters**. The CIA frets that China could have a hundred nuclear missiles targeted on the United States by 2015, but that is actually evidence of China's **great restraint.** The first Chinese nuclear weapons test was forty years ago, and by now China could have thousands of nuclear warheads targeted on the U.S. if it wanted. (The United States DOES have thousands of nuclear warheads that can strike Chinese targets.) The Beijing regime is obsessed with economic stability, because it fears that a severe downturn would trigger social and political upheaval. The last thing it wants is a military confrontation with its biggest trading partner, the United States. It will go on playing the nationalist card over Taiwan to curry domestic political favor, but there is no massive military build-up and **no plausible threat of impending war in East Asia.**

**. Russia is far too weak to attack the US**

Lieber, 07 (Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University - Robert J., "Persistent Primacy and the Future of the American Era", APSA Paper 2007, http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/2/1/1/0/5/pages211058/p211058-1.php)

Constraints on the capacity of adversaries also needs to be taken into account. Russia under Putin has put pressure on its immediate neighbors and seeks to rebuild its armed forces, but Moscow’s ability to regain the superpower status of the former Soviet Union remains limited. The Russian armed forces are in woeful condition, the total population is half that of the USSR and declining by 700,000 per year, the economy is overwhelmingly dependent on revenues from oil and natural gas and thus vulnerable if world market prices soften, and the long term stability of its crony capitalism and increasingly authoritarian political system are uncertain. China, despite extraordinary economic growth and modernization, will continue to depend on rapid expansion of trade and the absorption of vast numbers of people moving from the countryside to the cities. It may well become a major military challenger of the United States, first regionally and even globally, but only over the long term.

**2. Mutual interests ensure cooperation**

Arbatov, 07 (Alexei, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, member of the Editorial Board of Russia in Global Affairs, “Is a New Cold War Imminent,” Russia in Global Affairs, No. 2, July-September 2007, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1130.html)

First, the present dispute lacks the Cold War’s system-forming element, that is, bipolarity. In addition to the global and transregional centers of economic and military force, such as the U.S., the EU, Japan, Russia and China, the world is witnessing the growth of regional leaders, among them India, Pacific ‘small tigers,’ member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Iran, Brazil, South Africa and Nigeria. Additionally, the mighty currents of globalization and the information revolution are eroding traditional forms of interstate relations. Nor can we discount the ubiquitous growth of nationalism, and the increased role of transnational economic, political and even military actors. Russian-U.S. relations no longer represent the central axis of global politics. It is just one of its many facets – and not the most important one in many issues. Apart from some contradictions, Russia and the West share major common interests. Finally, they have other competitors beside themselves. Thus, a zero-sum game is out of the question. Whatever disagreements may divide Russia and the West, they are on the same side of the barricades in the ongoing international conflicts. In Afghanistan, for example, they act jointly, seeking to prevent a resurgence of Taliban and al-Qaeda activities. On other issues, such as the nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran, and the situations involving Palestine and Nagorno-Karabakh, they are attempting to solve these problems through multilateral negotiations. The once irreconcilable ideological rivalry between the two parties is now relegated to the past. The real ideological divide now lies between liberal-democratic values and Islamic radicalism, between the North and the South, and between the forces of globalization and anti-globalization. Russia may not be fertile ground for liberal values, but it will certainly never embrace radical Islam. Over the last 20 years, Russia has sustained the greatest losses in the struggle against Islamic extremism (the war in Afghanistan, and the wars and conflicts in Chechnya, Dagestan and Tajikistan).With regard to the arms race, despite the current growth in U.S. and Russian defense spending, the present situation is not remotely comparable to what took place during the Cold War. In the period from 1991 to 2012, that is, since the signing in Moscow of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-I) until the expiry of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, also known as the Moscow Treaty), signed in 2002, the strategic and tactical nuclear weapons of the two countries will be reduced by about 80 percent [the Moscow Treaty expires on December 31, 2012].>>

No escalation – disagreements remain limited

Weitz 11 (Richard, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor 9/27/2011, “Global Insights: Putin not a Game-Changer for U.S.-Russia Ties,” <http://www.scribd.com/doc/66579517/Global-Insights-Putin-not-a-Game-Changer-for-U-S-Russia-Ties>)

Fifth, there will inevitably be areas of conflict between Russia and the United States regardless of who is in the Kremlin. Putin and his entourage can never be happy with having NATO be Europe's most powerful security institution, since Moscow is not a member and cannot become one. Similarly, the Russians will always object to NATO's missile defense efforts since they can neither match them nor join them in any meaningful way. In the case of Iran, Russian officials genuinely perceive less of a threat from Tehran than do most Americans, and Russia has more to lose from a cessation of economic ties with Iran -- as well as from an Iranian-Western reconciliation. On the other hand, these conflicts can be managed, since they will likely remain limited and compartmentalized. Russia and the West do not have fundamentally conflicting vital interests of the kind countries would go to war over. And as the Cold War demonstrated, nuclear weapons are a great pacifier under such conditions. Another novel development is that Russia is much more integrated into the international economy and global society than the Soviet Union was, and Putin's popularity depends heavily on his economic track record. Beyond that, there are objective criteria, such as the smaller size of the Russian population and economy as well as the difficulty of controlling modern means of social communication, that will constrain whoever is in charge of Russia.

Conflicts will never go nuclear – prefer Russian generals

Ivashov 7 (Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems, 2007. Defense and Security, “Will America Fight Russia?” p. Lexis)

Numerous scenarios and options are possible. Everything may begin as a local conflict that will rapidly deteriorate into a total confrontation. An ultimatum will be sent to Russia: say, change the domestic policy because human rights are allegedly encroached on, or give Western businesses access to oil and gas fields. Russia will refuse and its objects (radars, air defense components, command posts, infrastructure) will be wiped out by guided missiles with conventional warheads and by aviation. Once this phase is over, an even stiffer ultimatum will be presented - demanding something up to the deployment of NATO "peacekeepers" on the territory of Russia. Refusal to bow to the demands will be met with a mass aviation and missile strike at Army and Navy assets, infrastructure, and objects of defense industry. NATO armies will invade Belarus and western Russia. Two turns of events may follow that. Moscow may accept the ultimatum through the use of some device that will help it save face. The acceptance will be followed by talks over the estrangement of the Kaliningrad enclave, parts of the Caucasus and Caspian region, international control over the Russian gas and oil complex, and NATO control over Russian nuclear forces. The second scenario involves a warning from the Kremlin to the United States that continuation of the aggression will trigger retaliation with the use of all weapons in nuclear arsenals. It will stop the war and put negotiations into motion.

We would crush them

Sharavin 7 (Alexander Sharavin, Director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, 2007. Defense and Security, “Will America Fight Russia?” p. Lexis)

The United States may count on a mass air raid and missile strike at objects of the Russian strategic nuclear forces and, perhaps, some objects of other branches of the Russian military. Plus, of course, at the military and political planning centers. Whatever targets may escape destruction on the first try will be bombed out of existence by repeated strikes. And Russia will have nothing to answer with. Even if some elements of the strategic nuclear forces survive, they will fall prey to the American national missile defense. The American strategic missile forces in their turn will escape the war unscathed.

### Agriculture

**The impact is exaggerated – Cuban ag isn’t sustainable**

**Thompson and Stephens, 12** – \* Ph.D. Curriculum and Education Director @ Duke University AND \*\* Marian Cheek Jackson Center (Charles D. and Alexander, “Visions for Sustainable Agriculture in Cuba and the United States: Changing Minds and Models through Exchange”, Southern States, March 22 2013, http://www.southernspaces.org/2012/visions-sustainable-agriculture-cuba-and-united-states-changing-minds-and-models-through-exchan) //SP

Following the Cuban Revolution (1953–59), the Soviet Union’s (USSR) agricultural imperatives drove the island toward state-run farms, marginalizing many family run operations. The breakup of the USSR in 1990 spelled the end of Soviet agricultural influence but intensified Cuban food shortages. **Cuba began to look within for solutions, finding indigenous knowledge and encouraging local innovation. Exaggerated praise for developments in the country’s sustainable agriculture belies the reality that Cuba is no utopia**. Popular descriptions often oversimplify the narrative of Cuba’s sustainable agriculture. For example, the website of the Durham, North Carolina, non-profit NEEM (Natural Environment Ecological Management) features a narrative sketch that labels the rise of organic garden collectives in Cuban cities "the urban agriculture miracle."5 Others have suggested that we can expect "an ecological agriculture" in Cuba’s future.6 In much sustainable agriculture praise of Cuba, we do not hear that the country (like the U.S.) has confinement hog and chicken houses, that major U.S. food conglomerates are already selling vast quantities of grain and other products there, or that the embargo on trade with Cuba does not apply to U.S. agribusiness. **We are not told that thousands work in small farming because they have no other option.** Agricultural work is popular in Cuba, in part, because state-supported income is drying up for hundreds of thousands of wage earners and there is often nowhere else to turn but to small-scale farms and gardens. Yet much of Cuba’s former sugarcane land, once a volatile but powerful economic life-force, is idle and in poor condition. **Even with its admirable innovations in sustainable and organic farming,** **Cuba’s domestic agricultural producers cannot meet the food needs of the island’s population; there is a real sense of food insecurity.** Looking for food (in dollar stores, on the black market, legally), is a major pre-occupation for much of the population. Cuba imports at least 80 percent of its food, with much of it coming from its largest trading partners—China and Venezuela. This is hardly a sustainable scenario, and while there does not appear to be starvation in Cuba, **food shortages remain a problem, even as the government’s meager food rationing is fading.**7 However, household food insecurity is also on the rise in the U.S. today. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture at least 14.5% of U.S. households were food insecure at some time during the year in 2010, up from 11% in 2005.

**ST solves this is their Scholik evidence**

**. Recent regulatory changes implemented by the U.S. government provide a means for individuals and businesses to begin forming the relationships with their Cuban counterparts that will lead to future trade opportunities**

**Zero chance the US adopts the Cuban model**

**Pfeiffer, 3** – energy editor for From the Wilderness (Dale, “Cuba-A Hope”, From the Wilderness,

<http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/120103_korea_2.html>.

Resistance to Cuban-style agricultural reform would be particularly stiff in the United States. Agribusiness will not allow all of its holdings and power to be expropriated. Nor is the U.S. government interested in small farms and organic agriculture. The direction of U.S. agriculture is currently towards more advanced technology, greater fossil fuel dependency, and less sustainability. The ability of small farmers and urban gardens to turn a profit is effectively drowned out by the overproduction of agribusiness.

**1. Icebergs are a negative feedback – none of their evidence takes this into account**

**Macfarlane, 09** (Jo, The Daily Mail Online. “Amazing discovery of green algae which could save the world from global warming” http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1104772/Amazing-discovery-green-algae-save-world-global-warming.html?ITO=1490#)

Melting icebergs, so long the iconic image of global warming, are triggering a natural process that could delay or even end climate change, British scientists have found. A team working on board the Royal Navy’s HMS Endurance off the coast of Antarctica have discovered tiny particles of iron are released into the sea as the ice melts. The iron feeds algae, which blooms and sucks up damaging carbon dioxide (CO2), then sinks, locking away the harmful greenhouse gas for hundreds of years. The team think the process could hold the key to staving off globally rising temperatures. Lead researcher Professor Rob Raiswell, from Leeds University, said: ‘The Earth itself seems to want to save us.’ As a result of the findings, a ground-breaking experiment will be held this month off the British island of South Georgia, 800 miles south east of the Falklands. It will see if the phenomenon could be harnessed to contain rising carbon emissions. Researchers will use several tons of iron sulphate to create an artificial bloom of algae. The patch will be so large it will be visible from space. Scientists already knew that releasing iron into the sea stimulates the growth of algae. But environmentalists had warned that to do so artificially might damage the planet’s fragile ecosystem. Last year, the UN banned iron fertilisation in the Great Southern Ocean. However, the new findings show the mechanism has actually been operating naturally for millions of years within the isolated southern waters. And it has led to the researchers being granted permission by the UN to move ahead with the experiment. The scientist who will lead the next stage of the study, Professor Victor Smetacek, said: ‘The gas is sure to be out of the Earth’s atmosphere for several hundred years.’ The aim is to discover whether artificially fertilising the area will create more algae in the Great Southern Ocean. That ocean is an untapped resource for soaking up CO2 because it doesn’t have much iron, unlike other seas. It covers 20million square miles, and scientists say that if this could all be treated with iron, the resulting algae would remove three-and-a-half gigatons of carbon dioxide. This is equivalent to one eighth of all emissions annually created by burning fossil fuels such as oil, gas and coal. It would also be equal to removing all carbon dioxide emitted from every power plant, chimney and car exhaust in the rapidly expanding industries of India and Japan. However, the experts warn it is too early to say whether it will work. The team from ice patrol ship HMS Endurance used sledgehammers to chip deep into the interior of a 33ft-long mass of polar ice from half-a-dozen house-sized icebergs that had blown ashore in Antarctica. Once back in the UK, they used a special microscope to analyse the samples, which revealed what they had been looking for – tiny iron particles, only a few millionths of a millimetre wide, embedded deep within the ice. Until now, it was thought that the only source of iron in the Southern Ocean was wind blowing in metal compounds from the deserts of nearby continents like Australia. But the research has disproved this. Prof Raiswell said: ‘These particles measure only a fraction of a millimetre, but they have great importance for the global climate.’ Rising global temperatures, particularly over the past 50 years, have increased the rate at which polar ice melts, causing sea levels to rise. Ten of the warmest years on record have been since 1991, with experts predicting that 2009 could be the hottest year yet. The climate-change effect is set to substantially increase over the coming decades, as developing industrial nations pump out more CO2. Temperatures along the Antarctic Peninsula alone have increased by 2.5C over the past 50 years. But for every percentage point increase in the amount of ice that breaks off, Prof Raiswell calculates that a further 26million tons of CO2 is removed from the atmosphere.

**2. CO2 is not anthropogenic – their evidence is based on a misinterpretation**

**Marohasy, 09** (Jennifer, senior fellow at the Australian think tank the Institute of Public Affairs, PhD in biology from the University of Queensland. Cites research from Robert H. Essenhigh, Department of Mechanical Engineering at Ohio State University, “Carbon Dioxide in Atmosphere 5-15 Years Only” 4-17-09. http://jennifermarohasy.com/blog/2009/04/carbon-dioxide-in-atmosphere-5-15-years-only/)

If carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels only stayed in the atmosphere a few years, say five years, then there may not be quite the urgency currently associated with anthropogenic global warming. Indeed it might be argued that the problem of elevated levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide could be easily reversed as soon as alternative fuel sources where found and/or just before a tipping point was reached. The general consensus, however, is not five years, but rather more in the range of 50 to 200 years. But in a new technical paper to be published in the journal ‘Energy and Fuels’, Robert Essenhigh from Ohio State University, throws doubt on this consensus. Using the combustion/chemical-engineering Perfectly Stirred Reactor (PSR) mixing structure, or 0-D Box, as the basis of a model for residence time in the atmosphere, he explains that carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels are likely to have a residence time of between 5 and 15 years. He further concludes that the current trend of rising atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations is not from anthropogenic sources, but due to natural factors. Here’s the abstract: The driver for this study is the wide-ranging published values of the CO2 atmospheric residence time (RT), with the values differing by more than an order of magnitude, where the significance of the difference relates to decisions on whether: (1) to attempt control of combustion-sourced (anthropogenic) CO2 emissions, if >100 years; or (2) not to attempt control, if ~10 years. This given difference is particularly evident in the IPCCFirst (1990) Climate Change Report where, in the opening Policymakers Summary of the Report**,** the RT is stated to be in the range 50 to 200 years; and, (largely) based on that, it was also concluded in the Report and from subsequent related studies that the current rising level of CO2 was due to combustion of fossil fuels**,** thus carrying the, now widely-accepted, rider that CO2 emissions from combustion should therefore be curbed.

However, the actual data in the text of the IPCC Report separately states a value of 4 years. The differential of these two times isthenclearly identifiedin the relevant supporting-documents of the report as being, separately: (1) a long-term (~100 years) adjustment or response time to accommodate imbalance increases in CO2 emissions from all sources; and, (2) the actual RT in the atmosphere, of ~4 years. As check on that differentiation, and its alternative outcome, the definition and determination of RT thus defined the need for and focus of this study. In this study, using the combustion/chemical-engineering Perfectly Stirred Reactor (PSR) mixing structure, or 0-D Box, for the model-basis, as alternative to the more-commonly used Global Circulation Models (GCM’s), to define and determine the RT in the atmosphere, then, using data from the IPCC and other sources for model validation and numerical determination, the data: (1) support the validity of the PSR model-application in this context; and (2) from the analysis, provide (quasi-equilibrium) residence times for CO2 of: ~5 years carrying C12; and of ~16 years carrying C14, with both valuesessentially inagreement with the IPCC short-term (4-year) value, separately, in agreement with most other data sources and notably a (1998) listing by Segalstad of 36 other published values, also in the range 5 to 15 years. Additionally, the analytical results then also support the IPCC analysis and data on the longer “adjustment time” (~100 years) governing the long-term rising “quasi-equilibrium” concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere. For principal verification of the adopted PSR model, the data source used was outcome of the injection of excess 14CO2 into the atmosphere during the A-bomb tests in the 1950’s/60’s which generated an initial increase of approximately 1000% above the normal value, and which then declined substantially exponentially with time, with = 16 years, in accordance with the (unsteady-state) prediction from, and jointly providing validation for, the PSR analysis. With the short (5-15 year) RT results shown to be in quasi-equilibrium, this then supports the (independently-based) conclusion that the long-term (~100-year) rising atmospheric CO2 concentration is not from anthropogenic sources but, in accordance with conclusions from other studies, is most probably the outcome of the rising atmospheric temperature which is due to other natural factors. This further supports the conclusion that global warming is not anthropogenically driven as outcome of combustion. The economic and political significance of that conclusion will be self-evident.

**3. Growing emissions in developing countries make CO2 reduction impossible – modeling is irrelevant**

**Koetzle, 08** – Ph.D. and Senior Vice President of Public Policy at the Institute for Energy Research (William, “IER Rebuttal to Boucher White Paper”, 4/13/2008, http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2008/04/13/ier-rebuttal-to-boucher-white-paper/)

For example, if the United States were to unilaterally reduced emissions by 30% or 40% below 2004 levels[8] by 2030; net global CO2 emissions would still increase by more than 40%. The reason is straightforward: either of these reduction levels is offset by the increases in CO2 emissions in developing countries. For example, a 30% cut below 2004 levels by 2030 by the United States offsets less than 60% of China’s increase in emissions during the same period. In fact, even if the United States were to eliminate all CO2 emissions by 2030, without any corresponding actions by other countries, world-wide emissions would still increase by 30%. If the United States were joined by the other OECD countries in a CO2 reduction effort, net emissions would still significantly increase. In the event of an OCED-wide reduction of 30%, global emissions increase by 33%; a reduction of 40% still leads to a net increase of just under 30%. Simply put, in order to hold CO2 emissions at 2004 levels, absent any reductions by developing nations like China and India, all OECD emissions would have to cease.[9] The lack of participation by all significant sources of GHGs not only means it is unlikely that net reductions will occur; it also means that the cost of meaningful reductions is increased dramatically. Nordhous (2007) for example, argues that for the “importance of near-universal participation to reduce greenhouse gases.”[10] His analysis shows that GHG emission reduction plans that include, for example, 50% of world-wide emissions impose additional costs of 250 percent. Thus, he find’s GHG abatement plans like Kyoto (which does not include significant emitters like the United States, China, and India) to be “seriously flawed” and “likely to be ineffective.” [11] Even if the United States had participated, he argues that Kyoto would make “but a small contribution to slowing global warming, and it would continue to be highly inefficient.”[12]The data on emissions and economic analysis of reduction programs make it clear that GHG emissions are a global issue. Actions by localities, sectors, states, regions or even nations are unlikely to effectively reduce net global emissions unless these reductions are to a large extent mirrored by all significant emitting nations.

**4. Observational data proves warming has stopped – the multi-decadal oscillation overwhelms CO2 forcing**

**Akasofu, 08** – Former director of the Geophysical Institute and the International Arctic Research Center @ U of Alaska-Fairbanks (Syun-Ichi, “Global warming has paused”, 9/27/2008, http://newsminer.com/news/2008/sep/27/global-warming-has-paused/?opinion)

Recent studies by the Hadley Climate Research Center (UK), the Japan Meteorological Agency, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the University of East Anglia (UK) and the University of Alabama Huntsville show clearly that the rising trend of global average temperature stopped in 2000-2001. Further, NASA data shows that warming in the southern hemisphere has stopped, and that ocean temperatures also have stopped rising. The global average temperature had been rising until about 2000-2001. The International Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) and many scientists hypothesize rising temperatures were mostly caused by the greenhouse effect of carbon dioxide (CO2), and they predicted further temperature increases after 2000. It was natural to assume that CO2 was responsible for the rise, because CO2 molecules in the atmosphere tend to reflect back the infrared radiation to the ground, preventing cooling (the greenhouse effect) and also because CO2 concentrations have been rapidly increasing since 1946. But, this hypothesis on the cause of global warming is just one of several. Unfortunately, many scientists appear to forget that weather and climate also are controlled by nature, as we witness weather changes every day and climate changes in longer terms. During the last several years, I have suggested that it is important to identify the natural effects and subtract them from the temperature changes. Only then can we be sure of the man-made contributions. This suggestion brought me the dubious honor of being designated “Alaska’s most famous climate change skeptic.” The stopping of the rise in global average temperature after 2000-2001 indicates that the hypothesis and prediction made by the IPCC need serious revision. I have been suggesting during the last several years that there are at least two natural components that cause long-term climate changes. The first is the recovery (namely, warming) from the Little Ice Age, which occured approximately 1800-1850. The other is what we call the multi-decadal oscillation. In the recent past, this component had a positive gradient (warming) from 1910 to 1940, a negative gradient (cooling — many Fairbanksans remember the very cold winters in the 1960s) from 1940 to 1975, and then again a positive gradient (warming — many Fairbanksans have enjoyed the comfortable winters of the last few decades or so) from 1975 to about 2000. The multi-decadal oscillation peaked around 2000, and a negative trend began at that time. The second component has a large amplitude and can overwhelm the first, and I believe that this is the reason for the stopping of the temperature rise. Since CO2 has only a positive effect, the new trend indicates that natural changes are greater than the CO2 effect, as I have stated during the last several years.